Military Collector Group Post,

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    TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART I, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD Technical Intelligence in WW II probably had its origins in the reports sent back from Germany by Captain Rene Studler and the military attache in Berlin, Col. Truman Smith. Filed and forgotten until the war started, they were supplemented by reports on captured material sent back to the states by then Captain George Jarrett, an ammunition advisor to the British forces in North Africa. Many of the items that he sent back were also filed and forgotten until the establishment, in 1943, of the Foreign Material Branch. As the war progressed, the need for technical information on enemy weapons increased. Special teams were formed to evacuate captured enemy material. By the end of WW II in Europe there were over 4,000 people conducting some form of technical investigation. Many were duplicating the efforts of others! Although a wealth of information was generated, much of it was too late to be of immediate importance. The situation in the Pacific at the start of the war was not very much better. When the United States was plunged into a Far Eastern war with Japan by the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, we came face to face with the fact that we knew little or nothing about that Island empire. What had Japan in the way of an Army and Navy? What about their Marianas outposts and the other Jap mandated islands? How and with what weapons would the Japanese fight? Many of these questions in the early phases of the war were unanswered. We had a war on our hands yet we were uncertain of the enemy's capabilities. Our Technical Intelligence was practically non-existent --, and we almost lost the war as a result. We found the enemy much more potent than most strategists had expected, and we paid for underestimating his strength with a series of strategic withdrawals to the south. We lost important bases for a counter offensive -- the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Borneo, the entire group of islands to the north of New Guinea, even the northern portion of New Guinea itself. With only two American and two Australian divisions between them and a completion of the conquest of the whole Western Pacific, the Japs were finally stopped on the Yokada Trail in their drive toward the Allied base at Port Moresby. The comeback looked long and hard. Over three thousand miles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands lay between us and Tokyo. We now knew the enemy's capabilities and how absolutely his whole home economy had been geared to total war, but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy's material, equipment and weapons, except their terrific effect. These were among the major objectives of the Allies; to know what weapons the enemy had so that we could devise countermeasures and countertactics of our own; to exploit important discoveries for our own benefit; to win the technological race. In the earliest months of the war the United States had a mere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific Theater, dependent for training upon the Australian Army. Then Technical Intelligence was taken over by the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service sections of the united States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) under the supervision of their respective service chiefs. Their operations, beginning in a small way, culminated 3 January 1944 in the formation of a coordinated organization of the six major services, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). The 470 technical experts administered through this company kept the Allied Forces informed of Japanese progress in arms, ammunition and equipment. They were the eyes and the ears of the army in the battle of the Pacific. As differentiated from the enemy in Europe, the Japanese fought, in many cases, on a shoestring; their tenuous supply lines, reaching to the various island groups, were generally severed before the Allied troops went into operation and backlogs of enemy supplies were consequently well depleted; surrender en masse, such as occurred in Europe, with the accompanying seizure of large stores of enemy supplies, was unknown in the war with Japan until the summer of 1945 -- when the war was over. The capture, then, of any considerable quantity of Japanese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence importance. December 1942 -- January 1944 From the opening of the Pacific War until November 1942, there was little Technical Intelligence activity in the Southwest Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.). A few small arms and some ammunition plus a few items of Chemical Warfare equipment were turned into the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for examination and then forwarded by both American and Australian forces to the Australian Army for examination, test and report. No organized attempt had been made, however, to have Technical Intelligence carried into the field by a team of men skilled in collecting and analyzing captured enemy equipment. In November 1942, Training Circular No. 81 established a more closely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of Intelligence value. The flow of material was from combat troops (there were, as yet, no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops in the combat zone, to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service, to the Chief of the appropriate service in the United States. Flow of informational reports was through channels from the combat troops to the S-2 or G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (AC of S) to the War Department, as well as interchangeably with the service troops handling the material. Combat personnel capturing equipment of new design sent it rearward through normal recovery channels together with accessories, ammunition, and pertinent information, each service handling its own equipment. Simultaneously, a report was rendered through channels. Maintenance and supply service personnel delivered captured equipment, with no maintenance other than the application of preservatives, direct to the Theater special staff officer of the same arm or service or to his designated establishment (such as a base shop or depot). Report was made at the same time to the G-2 of their command. Both combat and maintenance personnel recovering a new type of material of a class supplied by another service delivered it to the nearest organization of the appropriate service. Theater staff officers were responsible for preliminary expert analysis as to the characteristics of the material. Based upon this, they made preliminary deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war, as evidenced by the material, and published preliminary operators and maintenance manuals, with instructions on local modifications that could be made so that the captured equipment could be used by United Nations troops in the field. These reports, together with the captured material (half of the captured material went to the Australians, half to the United States) were then transmitted to the chief of the arm or service concerned in the United States. Complete reports were also made by the Theater staff officers to the G-2 of the Theater staff, and necessary arrangements were made when possible to exploit the enemy material when captured in large quantities. The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zone of the Interior made final analysis and deductions and prepared final operator's and maintenance manuals and visual training aids. The Theater G-2, under the provisions of this circular, it will be noted, merely transmitted information on the equipment and had no responsibility in its processing. As the battle for Buna and Gona, New Guinea, was drawing to a close in December 1942, a group of five Ordnance officers and ten enlisted men were preparing to leave the United States for the Southwest Pacific Area. These men were specialists in ammunition, small arms artillery, fire control equipment, and tracked and wheeled vehicles. Prior to their departure they were given an intensive indoctrination in Ordnance Technical Intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and at Washington, D.C. On arrival at Headquarters, United States Army Service of Supply (USASOS), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December 1942, Major Alan C. Johnston, ranking officer, was placed in charge of the group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organization for the Theater. The program was to operate under the technical control of the Chief Ordnance officer, USASOS, in accordance with general policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the headquarters. The detachment was broken down into three sections: The Administrative Section, besides being responsible for the general supervision of Ordnance Intelligence activities, issued reports, maintained liaison with United States and Australian Technical Intelligence organizations in other theaters, collected new data issued in the Pacific Theater on Japanese Ordnance material, and forwarded this information to the Chief of Ordnance, Washington D.C. The second section consisted of Technical Intelligence Field Teams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted men, who operated from an advance base or with a task force, division or corps. Their duties were to collect, identify, prepare preliminary reports on new items, and ship captured Japanese material to the Ordnance Analysis Section. The third Section was the Ordnance Analysis Section, located at Brisbane, Australia, which received material from field teams, analyzed and prepared reports on new items, prepared and shipped Japanese Ordnance material to United States troops in the Theater for training and to the United States for Technical investigation and training, and maintained liaison with Technical Intelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters, (GHQ) SWPA, with General Staff, Intelligence, of the Australian Army at Australian Land Headquarters and with the Master General of Ordnance, in Melbourne). There was considerable flexibility in these sections and personnel were often used interchangeably, i.e., headquarters analysis section personnel went into the field and vice versa. From January until July, when part of the personnel were pulled for field work, the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail on practically all of the material that was captured. They issued 26 complete technical reports -- one report on the 75mm AA gun, was over 50 pages long, and contained 30 photographs. Technical Intelligence personnel received training and information from the Australian Army in the early days, which was quite valuable. Capt Madigan, the Assistant O.I.C., and two enlisted men spent 19 days in Melbourne in January 1943, at the office of the Master General of Ordnance in Wesley College, looking over their complete collection of Japanese Ordnance, taking the weapons apart, studying and analyzing them. Though Technical Intelligence was never actually under the Australian Army for administration, except in the same capacity as the other United States forces were attached for early operations, the alliance and cooperation was close and was of great benefit to both armies. Later, in February 1943, when Technical Intelligence was turned over to United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). Major Johnston was appointed Technical Intelligence Officer, operating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Capt. Madigan, at that time operating out of Base "B", Oro Bay, New Guinea, took charge of all field teams; he also assumed responsibility for investigating the Japanese Ordnance material held by the Master General of Ordnance, Australian Army; and from 6 March to 11 July 1943 went on temporary duty with the 42 Chemical Laboratory Company to investigate Japanese explosives and ammunition. Whereas Ordnance Technical Intelligence personnel had been sent directly to the Pacific from the United States, the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed locally. Throughout 1942, new types of captured enemy equipment were sent to the Chemical Warfare Service Intelligence Officer, Headquarters, New Guinea Forces, Australia, who made the preliminary examination and determined its operational significance. It was then sent to Land Headquarters, Australian Army, Melbourne, (later, Advance Land Headquarters, Brisbane) for Technical Intelligence. Land Headquarters then issued the equipment to the appropriate arm or service for complete technical analysis and report. Chemical Warfare munitions were sent to either 42d Chemical Laboratory or the Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratory, Marybyrnong, Victoria, Australia. The entire channel of evacuation was Australian. This was improved somewhat in January 1943, when arrangements were made for United States Chemical Warfare Intelligence Officers to be notified of material sent back from the forward area by United States forces so that they could work with Land Headquarters, Australian Army, on the disposition of that material. There was, however, no established Chemical Warfare Intelligence organization. The work was carried on as one of the functions of the chemical laboratories under the supervision of the Technical Intelligence officer of the Chemical Warfare Section, Headquarters, USASOS. Their analysis consisted merely of examining and reporting on Japanese chemical material. It became apparent that in addition to the laboratory analysis, an organization was needed which could collect equipment and study Japanese tactics, method and preparations for chemical warfare. In February 1943, when USAFFE was activated, a Chemical Warfare Section was set up in that Headquarters with an Intelligence officer detailed to formulate plans for more comprehensive Intelligence organization. At this time there were two officers and one enlisted man in the Chemical Intelligence Section, Headquarters, USASOS: To these was added another officer, responsible for documents research and publications. In addition, three officers and three enlisted men were assigned to three field Chemical Warfare Intelligence teams working under the direction of Headquarters USAFFE in the forward areas. On 27 May 1943 the Commanding General, USASOS, was directed to "establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment, conveniently located in relation to the captured enemy equipment depot of the Australian Army now located in Baso Section 3". The Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service analysis sections were still separate from the depot, which was used only for shipping and receiving equipment; and still there was no Technical Intelligence by Engineers, Medical Corps, Quartermaster or Signal Corps; nevertheless, it was the first step toward coordination. At the same time, Technical Intelligence of the United States and Australia was more closely coordinated through the activation of the Joint Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board which replaced Land Headquarters in determining the final disposition of captured equipment. All material received at both the United States and Australian depots was checked by the Allied Enemy Equipment Board for disposition. The Board, consisting of two members from the United States, two from the Australian forces, and one from Allied Naval Forces, made disposition of material based on Technical training needs. This permitted both forces to obtain items which might not otherwise be available. Major Johnston was appointed as a member of this board in June 1943. During the period 16 June to 8 September 1943, CWS Intelligence Team No. 1 was sent on temporary duty to United States Advance Base, Port Moresby, New Guinea. Their mission was to establish liaison with Technical Intelligence units from United States Army Ordnance, Fifth Air Force Naval Intelligence, the Royal Australian Air Force, and Headquarters New Guinea Forces. They were to clarify the channels through which enemy material and Intelligence reports and equipment would go, and to provide that such channels were functioning properly. At the same time, the team was to be prepared to proceed to any area to investigate matters of interest to Chemical Warfare. The Buna -- Gona -- Sanananda, New Guinea operations were conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps, with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting. Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in the Theater in December had a team in the field by 18 January. Two officers and four enlisted men were sent to Port Moresby to stage for two weeks for Buna -- Gona. During the next six months they covered this entire area and shipped back much valuable Ordnance equipment to Brisbane for analysis. In June, the officers returned to Brisbane and were assigned to the analysis section. Nassau Bay: 30 June 1943 On 30 June 1943 the McKechnie Force, composed of elements of the 41st Infantry Division attached to the 5th Australian Division, landed at Nassau Bay and quickly mopped up the small enemy garrison there. An Ordnance T. I. Team came up from the Buna -- Gona area in early July so that they might be on hand before the equipment and material could be destroyed or souvenired by United States troops. As the offensive followed up the coast, the newly formed Ordnance T. I. Team continued operation with the combat troops. CWS Intelligence Team No. 3, covered the Nassau Bay operations for CWS. Air transportation from Brisbane was obtained by the team on 25 June to Port Moresby, thence across the Owen Stanley Range to Dobodura, near Oro Bay. Here the team was attached to the Chemical Section, Headquarters 41st Infantry Division, and spent two weeks going through the old battlegrounds CWS Intelligence Team No. 3, covered the Nassau Bay operations for CWS. Air transportation from Brisbane was obtained by the team on 25 June to Port Moresby, thence across the Owen Stanley Range to Dobodura, near Oro Bay. Here the team was attached to the Chemical Section, Headquarters 41st Infantry Division, and spent two weeks going through the old battlegrounds in the Buna -- Gona area where they contacted the men who had taken part in the action and who were at this time established in defensive positions along the beach (the operations had "closed" 22 January ...). The team was then attached to the McKechie Force and sailed on 12 July for Morobe and later on up to Nassau Bay. On 22 July, their mission was completed and they departed and escorted captured material to the rear. On 4 September 1943 under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment, a large Australian force landed and established beachheads fifteen miles northeast of Lae, cutting the enemy's line of communications to Finschhafen and the north coast of New Guinea. On the following day, preceded by heavy bombing and strafing, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment parachuted and captured the airfield at Nadzab ( a few miles northwest of Lae). Airborne troops were quickly moved in, and following a rapid advance by both forces, Lae fell to the allies on 16 September 1943. Meanwhile, Salamaua had fallen on 11 September and the remnants of four Japanese divisions, half-starved and malaria ridden, were pursued back east along the coast toward Morobe, bitterly contesting every Allied gain. A team of one officer and two EM operated with the Australian forces. When the operation was over they returned to headquarters, USAFFE for duty with another field team. The team salvaged all Japanese Ordnance material of interest in the area, totaling about 60 tons of weapons (including fifty pieces of artillery) and ninety tons of ammunition. Lae -- Salamaua was the most productive of enemy Ordnance equipment up to the Hollandia operation. It was reported that there were also large quantities of Chemical Warfare equipment stored in the Salamaua -- Lae area. On 8 September orders were issued attaching Chemical Warfare Intelligence Team No. 1, to the 5th Australian Infantry Division, which was operating in the Salamaua area. It was not thought, however, at this time, that Lae would fall in the near future, and it was anticipated that Team No. 1 would be able to cover the Salamaua area first and then proceed to Lae. In the event that Lae fell prior to the completion of the Salamaua mission, arrangements were made for CWS Intelligence Team No. 2 to proceed to Lae immediately. During September 1943 operations around Lae were intensified and with the greater part of the available transport planes being used to fly in troops and supplies, transportation for CWS Intelligence Team No. 1 was delayed and they did not arrive in Dobodura until 16 September. Upon arrival, they reported to the United States liaison officer, 1st Australian Corps. It was learned that Lae had fallen that very day and a message was sent, suggesting that CWS Team No 2 proceed there at once. Meanwhile, considerable quantities of enemy Chemical Warfare equipment were found throughout the area by Team No.1. After an air raid alarm on the morning of the 20th September, CWS Team No.2, took off from Ward Drome, Port Moresby, and flew to Nadzab, the closest point to Lae. Upon landing, they reported to the 7th Australian Division which was located a short distance from the field. There, arrangements were made for them to report to 26th Australian Brigade, located in Lae. While they were awaiting transportation to Lae, nine Japanese bombers came over, but mistaking them for friendly planes, no one paid any attention until the anti-aircraft guns opened up over the field. After all this delay transportation was finally secured to Lae. Capt Forcyth of Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter section was there with a Japanese interpreter. Lt Brown of Mobile Explosives Investigating Unit (MEIU) United States Navy, was contacted, and also Lt White, who had been transferred with Sgt Bruner from the Ordnance Analysis Section to Ordnance Technical Intelligence, Fifth Air Force. Shortly after arrival, the team was transferred from the 26th Australian Brigade to Headquarters 23d Port Detachment, where transportation facilities were more available. After collecting samples of all the Japanese equipment found in the area, the team departed on the 25th of September for Salamaua where they met CWS Team No. 1. This team planned to proceed to Lae and from there to Finschhafen as soon as it should fall. All captured equipment collected by CWS Team No. 1 in the Salamaua area was flown by plane from Salamaua back to Dobodura. On 26 September, transportation by water was obtained to Lae, and Headquarters for CWS Team No. 1 was set up with the 23d Port Headquarters. After a two-day wait for air transportation, the team left for Port Moresby with the equipment collected at Lae and Salamaua. By this time the cleaning up of Lae had progressed considerably. As at Salamaua, it was again evident that the Japanese had evacuated the area is great haste. Large quantities of documents, ammunition and equipment had been left undestroyed. In a coordinated land, sea and air movement an Australian force moved around the coast from Lae and under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment, landed and established beachheads six miles north of Finschhafen on 22 September 1943. The speed of the double development of Lae and Finschhafen apparently had caught the enemy by surprise. Fierce fighting followed the Allied landing, and in the latter stages of the operation many hundreds of Japs died of starvation, wounds and sickness. The capture of Finchhafen insured Allied control of Huon Gulf, and dislocated the enemy's grip on British New Guinea. On 2d October, the CWS Team was notified that Finchhafen had been occupied and arrangements for transportation to that area were made immediately. After landing at the wrong beachhead (which was within five hundred years of the Japanese position), the team hitch-hiked through the jungle to Finschhafen, six miles away. Here they attached themselves to a Company of the 13th Battalion, 20th Australian Brigade, which was in charge of salvaging enemy equipment in that area. After recovering all available enemy Chemical Warfare equipment the team left Finschhafen and returned to Lae and then back to Nadzab, Dobodura, Port Moresby and finally to Brisbane. On 29 September 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferred by USAFFE to USASOS, and in late October plans were made by USASOS to provide for a Technical Intelligence Depot consisting of five sections: The original two, Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service, and in addition, Quartermaster, Medical and Transportation. No detachment was formed, however, for the entire set-up was changed by USAFFE directive, Subject; "Responsibility of Technical Intelligence", dated 22 December 1943. By this directive, the responsibility for ground Technical Intelligence within the United States Army Forces in the Far East was delegated to the Commanding General, USASOS. He was directed to appoint qualified officers to serve as United States Army representatives on the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board, to provide necessary officer and enlisted personnel to operate the United States Captured Enemy Equipment Depot and to furnish Technical Intelligence personnel both officer and enlisted for inclusion in task force Intelligence teams, USAFFE USASOS. Technical Intelligence operations in SWPA had, in the past, been carried on by detachments of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel and supervision of activities. In order to provide an efficient basis for operations of the various Technical Intelligence detachments, USASOS, G-2 Sauve; submitted a proposed plan of operation with a recommended T/O and T/E that included, for the first time, the six major services, (all except Transportation Corps) and that was estimated to be adequate for Theater needs, and recommended that a Technical Intelligence Composite company be activated. This proposal was forwarded to Commanding General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. It was felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactory Technical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services, that it would make possible the necessary flexibility of operation and movement of personnel which was considered essential for the efficient functioning of the sections, and would enable the formation of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams. Under this arrangement, the several Technical Intelligence sections would be able to facilitate the collection and rapid dissemination of Technical Intelligence information. It would also enable them to control the distribution of captured enemy equipment according to technical and training needs in the Theater and in the United States. On 3 January 1944, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite company, Separate (Provisional) was organized as a provisional company by General Orders No. 2, Headquarters USASOS, so that assignment of personnel could be made and operations continued. T/O and T/E previously suggested to USAFFE, were used as guides, with personnel carried on detached service from source units. The formation of a separate Technical Intelligence Composite Company other than provisional was not favorably considered by USAFFE. On 20 January 1944, Chiefs of Services were directed to furnish qualified personnel for assignment on detached service to 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, separate (Provisional) "to enable the accomplishment of the Technical Intelligence mission". The transfer of personnel to the 5250th was effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. The principle of having a coordinating unit for Technical Intelligence proved highly satisfactory in the coming months of the war. Centralized control made it possible for teams from the six services to function as one unit, thus enabling them to aid each other during the first days of an operation when speed was important. Information, documents and equipment could be collected for all branches by all teams, and this equipment assembled in a central spot where it could be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination provided flexibility, made for greater ease and efficiency in matter of command, and eliminated the question concerning responsibility and scope of authority. Most important of all, coordination made it possible for the command to field adequately equipped teams formed and trained in time for all operations and assured complete coverage by Technical Intelligence. There was one very definite drawback, however -- the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was established only as a provisional organization. This in certain ways, complicated its administration, left its personnel still occupying T/O vacancies in units which they had never worked, made it generally impossible to secure well earned and long deserved promotions, and because the company operated on only a quasi-accepted basis, sometimes ham-strung its efforts when it could have been most effective. Nevertheless, under the direction of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), a comprehensive view of Japanese capabilities was secured and Technical Intelligence centered the period when the work of past years brought in positive results. It was a big step forward. The 5250th was composed of a coordination and administration section, and a technical section for each of the six major services. Each Technical section, composed of laboratory and enemy equipment Intelligence teams, operated under the technical supervision of the Chief of Service and under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 USASOS. Duties, as originally outlined in the recommendation to USAFFE, were followed with only minor modification. The Company Headquarters conducted administration of the Company and coordination of the activities of the several sections. In addition the Company commander was placed on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2 , USASOS, as Coordinator of Technical Intelligence. Major Johnston, Ord, in addition to his other duties, was appointed informally as temporary (without orders) commanding officer of the Company and G-2 Technical Intelligence Coordinator. In addition, one officer was on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, to conduct Technical Intelligence liaison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section SWPA. This responsibility was first delegated to Lt Col Jones, Chief Engineer Intelligence officer, and was later turned over to his assistant, Lt Girard R. Lowrey. There was also a Service Technical Intelligence Officer assigned to each staff section. His duties were to advise the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, to supervise Intelligence activities for the particular service, including training, collection, recording, storage and disposition of captured enemy materia, to collaborate with the Technical Intelligence sections of other services, and to review and issue reports on captured enemy material, installations and procedures, and to forward such information to their respective Chiefs of Service in Washington, D.C. One of the major elements of the company was the Administrative and Analysis Unit. Originally, only the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal sections operated analysis laboratories under the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the service concerned. Chemical Warfare Service continued to have its analysis work carried on at the 42d Chemical or Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratories, and Engineer and Medical Corps had no teams in the field until the Hollandia operation in April 1944. Laboratories for all the services were established after that. All Technical Intelligence sections, however, maintained administrative divisions, which, within the scope of their activities; advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, coordinated and supervised Intelligence activities, planned, supervised, and correlated Intelligence training activities, established and maintained intelligence liaison, and collaborated with the Technical Intelligence sections of other arms and services and Allied Forces within the Theater, maintained adequate liaison with the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Service, interpreted, evaluated and disseminated Intelligence information as prescribed and, in addition carried on adequate and necessary document research. They supervised the collection, recording, processing, storage and disposition of captured enemy material, obtained data on operational performance of captured enemy material, maintained a file of all reports and data available on Technical Intelligence, and reviewed and issued reports on captured enemy material, installations, procedure, etc. They also arranged for the shipment of selected items of captured enemy material to the United States for training and other purposes, as required. They also kept current, and submitted inventories of captured enemy equipment available to the service in the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or service laboratories, or enroute to that depot, or in the advance areas, prepared preliminary training manuals on the use of captured enemy equipment, installations, etc., and assisted in planning a training program for United States personnel. The third major element of the company were the Field Teams. These teams collected and forwarded technical combat information through G-2 of the task force to which they were assigned, arranged for the collection and forwarding of captured enemy equipment to the Service Chief for further analysis or to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or shipment to the United States, assisted and advised G-2 and the appropriate service officer of the task force on all matters of Technical Intelligence. They investigated reports of the use of new methods, weapons, or tactics, and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the task force, made preliminary examination of, and reported on enemy equipment captured by the task force. They cooperated with Technical Intelligence personnel of other services and Allied forces and also assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war when requested to do so. They also collected information regarding enemy installations, and prepared reports thereon for forwarding, arranged for the salvage of bulk supplies and material, submitted reports on captured enemy material forwarded to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, and maintained current inventories of captured enemy material. A fourth major sub-element was the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, which operated directly under the supervision of the Chief, Quartermaster Intelligence Section. They received, classified and maintained stock record accounts on all captured enemy equipment forwarded to the Depot and delivered selected items of captured enemy equipment to the appropriate service or force upon authority received from the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board. They packed and shipped to the United Stated selected items of captured enemy equipment, as directed, and prepared and kept current an inventory of captured enemy equipment and a record of the source and distribution of these items to be forwarded through channels at the proper time. A monthly report was prepared containing a list of captured enemy equipment forwarded to the United States during the month, and returned or forwarded to individuals for souveniring such items as were released on the certificate of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, or other authorized agencies. On 19 February 1944, a directive was received by Headquarters, USASOS, from the Commanding General, USAFFEE, to the effect that photographs, prints, rubbings and drawings of all nameplates or nameplate data from all captured enemy equipment would be forwarded to that Headquarters. The collection of nameplates and rubbings became one of the main missions of Technical Intelligence personnel. They were to send in literally thousands of these items during the coming months of war, and from information based on their translation (names, dates, etc.) Japanese manufacturers of war material were identified and located -- information that was important in determining air raid targets and in studying the enemy's economic status. Greater emphasis was also placed on analysis of captured equipment as an additional factor for the determination of the enemy's economic position. Sound deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war could be based on evidence obtained from a laboratory analyses of captured material. Technical reports included, when possible, conclusions, positive or negative, as to the enemy's economic status. These conclusions were based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recently and previously captured equipment. When such changes were noted, these items were returned to the United States for further laboratory analysis. In February 1944 Major Johnston, accompanied by one officer from each of the other six services and 1st Lt James E. Shelby, QMC, proceeded to advanced areas to inform base sections and army troops that as each of the six services were interested in material, all captured Japanese equipment was desired and should be forwarded. At the same time he informed personnel of the modification of the regulation that facilitated legitimate souveniring. (It was hoped that this would encourage troops to turn in captured equipment, though it turned out that it had little effect on the willful looting and destruction of enemy dumps.) Major Johnston also informed forward echelons of the procedure necessary for shipment of captured material. In December 1943 a request had been sent to G-2, USAFFE, to arrange with Sixth Army to have a combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit participate in the Cape Gloucester operation. However, after receiving permission from Sixth Army, the unit upon arrival at Finschhafen was not allowed to go forward. An officer and two enlisted men, however, did secure permission to go on the Saidor operation 2 January 1944, though the combined unit was not used. Lt. Bishop, T/4 Winn and CPL Beveridge, who had been the men assigned, had operated as an Ordnance Intelligence Team with the 32d Division since 20 October 1943, participated on this and minor operations up the New Guinea coast. From information secured, the team prepared a small booklet as an amplification of the Allied Land Force Headquarter's pamphlet on Japanese equipment. They also assisted in the staging program of the 32d Division on Goodenough Island, instructing the troops on booby traps and enemy Ordnance material. It was found more and more that such training of combat troops in use of Japanese weapons, especially small arms and machine guns, was of considerable value to the task force. The invasion of the Admiralty Islands, specifically Momote Airstrip on Los Negros, was begun 29 February 1944, when the enemy was caught completely off guard in a surprise landing. The campaign marked the final stage in the great swinging movement, pivoting on New Guinea, which had been the basic plan of operations in the Southwest Pacific. Men of the First Cavalry Division landed on Manus Island about one and a half miles northwest of Lorengau, on 15 March. They were covered by artillery fire from small neighboring islands seized the day before, and were supported by destroyers, P.T. boats and air bombardment. Brushing aside the initial light opposition, the force divided, one group heading toward the airstrip, the other branching off to the south. Within three days after their landing on Manus Island United States Cavalrymen captured Lorengau airstrip, and on 18 March they stormed their way into Lorengau town. They then had occupied all vital areas in the Admiralty Islands. The chief prize of the Admiralty victory was Sea Eagle Harbor, which had 55 miles of protected waterway formed by a lagoon of several islands and reefs. It and the two strategic airstrips at Lorengau on Manus Island and Momote on Los Negros, formed a potential base for intensive operations against the remaining enemy strongholds in New Britain and New Ireland. As originally planned in November 1943, and attempted for Cape Gloucestor, Technical Intelligence field operations were to be based on the principle of assigning a field unit composed of one officer and two enlisted men each to a Counter Intelligence team for each task force. This provided for collection and investigation of enemy material at the earliest possible moment after combat operations had begun. In accordance with this plan it was decided that a combined Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service unit should accompany the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralties campaign. (The other operations until the Hollandia operation in April 1944). A Counter Intelligence, Corps (CIC) officer was to be in charge of the unit and consolidated reports were to be forwarded covering Counter Intelligence, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Naval Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit (MEIU) No. 1 activities. Captured documents were to be forwarded to Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. The CIC team consisted of one officer, and eight enlisted men. Technical Intelligence personnel consisted of one officer, and two enlisted men, of the Ordnance Section; one officer, and two enlisted men, of the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section. Also as part of the unit were one Naval officer, Lt Bushnell, and one enlisted man from MEIU No. 1. The group was organized and fully equipped by G-2, USAFFE, before being sent to join the 1st Cavalry Division. Lt Frederick was placed in command of all personnel, including Technical Intelligence. They functioned as a unit with success during the entire Admiralty Islands campaign. Lt Frederick and Sgt Anderson (CIC), Lt Bushnell, MEIU (Navy), and Lt Henry (CWS) and Sgt Lischalk (Ord) composed the first section of the unit to leave for the Admiralties. They were attached to the S2 of the 12th Cavalry Regiment to accompany them to Los Negros where they were to reinforce the 5th Cavalry Regiment, then in combat. The departure was delayed for two days Admiralty Islands campaign. Lt Frederick and Sgt Anderson (CIC), Lt Bushnell, MEIU (Navy), and Lt Henry (CWS) and Sgt Lischalk (Ord) composed the first section of the unit to leave for the Admiralties. They were attached to the S2 of the 12th Cavalry Regiment to accompany them to Los Negros where they were to reinforce the 5th Cavalry Regiment, then in combat. The departure was delayed for two days and during this time Lt Henry assisted in preparing a geographic survey of Los Negros to be used by the regiment. The information thus obtained proved invaluable on later patrols. The group departed from Cape Sudest, New Guinea, so as to arrive at Hyane Harbor, Los Negros, on the 6th of March, (D plus 6). Although the crisis of the operation had passed, the area cleared by the troops was yet very small. This enabled the team to arrive at captured equipment and material dumps before they had been pillaged and souvenired. Lt Henry and Sgt Lischalk joined the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters at Sea Eagle Harbor. The top ranking officers of the Division were interested in Technical Intelligence, were anxious that the team should start immediately, and saw to it that it was provided with necessary equipment. During subsequent action, material and documents were received in great quantities, and cooperation from the line units and indivisdual soldiers was splendid. They gave information as to the location of dumps and brought in quantities of material. The lectures and demonstrations that had been given to the troops on the value of enemy equipment for Intelligence purposes paid high dividends. On 9 March, Lt Cemeron and Sgt Loveless arrived. A collection dump was organized and the first bulk shipment of captured material was shipped from Hyane Harbor. The remainder of the detachment arrived on 16 March. One EM was immediately utilized in following the assault back of Papitalai where a Chemical dump had been reported. Another EM was kept busy with photographic work for the detachment and Division G-2. Both men wee subsequently used on patrols, and continued with the unit until the end of the campaign. The dumps located consisted of weapons, ammunition, quartermaster items, and medical supplies of all kinds. Many small dumps were located a few yeards off the trail, protected and camouflaged by canvas, grass, or metal roofing. Each dump was usually of one class of supplies such as clothing, medical supplies or one type of ammunition. Chemical Warfare protection equipment and munitions were found in this sector. By October 1944, by means of island hopping, the United States Forces were ready to embark on the Philippine Campaign. By this time, knocking out pillboxes and isolated strong ponts had been developed into a science, the science of fighting a new type of warfare. Storming the beaches was also far from new, far behind the doughfeet lay such campaigns as Buna, Lae, Hollandia, Biak and many others. Some had been bloody and discouraging but a big job had been completed with exceedingly meager resources. With the Philipines in sight, the picture was completely changed. This time the United States Army had the men and the material, as well as the determination to carry the war through to a successful conclusion. The 13th of October 1944 saw a gigantic two-pronged convoy of 600 transports, landing craft and warships moving northward from Hollandia and westward from the Admiralties. Aboard were troops of the Sixth Army, the X and XXIV Corps. The group was escorted by air and sea by units of the Far East Air Force and the RAAF and elements of the United States Third and Seventh Fleets. General MacArthur was in personal command of the armada that was to make good the promise, "I shall return". On 17 October, the 6th Ranger Battalion struck the opening blow when they seized two islets guarding the entrance to Layte Gulf and on the morning of 20 October, unloading began on four beachheads along Leyte's east coast. Before the finish of the operatin, enemy forces on the island had risen to 150,000, including reinforcements brought in from the other islands. However, the initial attack was so overwhelming that Tacloban, Leyte, was captured with a loss of less than a dozen men and in less than two weeks the United States forces held two-thirds of the island of Leyte. On the morning of 20 October at 0600 hours, the naval bombardment of Leyte began. From 0600 hours until 0900 hours the battleships and cruisers fired approximately 2600 tons of explosives on that island. At 0900 hours, while the heavy units still continued their bombardment, the rocket launching LCI's moved up for the final blow before the actual assault troops began landing. They went in abreast of each other in a long line toward the beach, and began launching the rockets. From 0900 till 1000 hours all that could be hear was one long continuous rumbling roar coming from the island. By this time the first assault wave had almost reached the beach, the LCI's ceased their fire, and the first wave landed on Leyte against only slight opposition. The initial landings were made by the 7th and 24th Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Divisions. It was the plan for the Leyte operation to have three Technical Intelligence field units with the combat troops. They were organized along the lines of the first composite unit that participated in the Hollandia operation. Each unit was attached to a division and was composed of teams of all -- or nearly all -- of the services. Complete coverage of the designated combat sector, and coordination in administration and operation were thus assured Late in September, Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 was placed on temporary duty with the 24th Infantry Division at Hollandia to stage for the Leyte operation. This Unit was composed of Engineer Team No. 4, Ordnance Team No. 1, and a Signal Team. Leyte was the first operation for the Signal Team, composed of personnel recently assigned to the 5250th. During staging, members of Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 met with the AC of S, G-2, of the Division, to whom they were attached with members of ATIS, MEIU No. 1, and the CIC team. A complete briefing, methods of working together, priority in the collection of enemy equipment, etc., were thoroughly covered. As MEIU had the best facilities for rapid dissemination of information to the combat troops, it was decided that they would first call on all explosive material captured. The Technical Intelligence Ordnance Team would get next highest priority. Plans were made for the Unit to go ashore in the second wave. It became a standard policy throughout the rest of the war for Technical Intelligence teams to go in early -- within one hour if possible -- after the first wave landed, to prevent troops from souveniring valuable equipment, thus destroying its usefulness for Technical Intelligence. During staging, the Unit checked team and individual equipment, and drew replacements for shortages. At 1800 hours, 13 October, the Unit sailed with the convoy from Hollandia to Leyte. The United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot was the nerve center for Technical Intelligence activities. It was administered directly under the control of G-2, USASOS, with each service operating an analysis section under the technical supervision of its respective service chief. Technical Intelligence units preparing for operations staged at the Depot and upon termination of duty in the field returned there, where the personnel were integrated into the analysis section staff. All equipment and material recovered by the teams was brough or sent to the Technical Intelligence Depot for study and research. Shipping from the Depot at Finschhafen to the united States improved considerably during October, November and December. Shipping from outlying bases was slow. A quanitty of equipment particularly Signal Corps and Ordnance material was received from New Guinea operations, Biak, Sansapor and Moratai, and as a result of the rapid advance of United States troops during January and February on Leyte, an unusually large quantity from all the services was recovered. At the same time a steady stream of small items confiscated by base censors and base Intelligence officers flowed in. Japanese aircraft equipment shipped from Aitape and other New Guinea bases was transshipped to Air Technical Intelligence, Far East Air Force, for disposition. Some confusion in the handling of name plates was evident. The War Department had directed that all nameplates should be mailed to the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., but the Chiefs of Services prohibited the removal of nameplates from equipment to be shipped to the United States. However, Technical and economic warfare Intelligence requirements could both be satisfied by double distribution of nameplate information and therefore, the following procedure went into effect: nameplates received from Technical Intelligence teams, Analysis Sections or postal censors, unless cleared by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section with the task forces, were forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, Hq. USASOS, Army Service Forces, Washington. Nameplates of extreme technical significance, integral parts of the equipment, were photographed or duplicated by rubbings, and the prints, negatives or rubbings mailed to Army Service Forces, Washington. Throughout this period nameplates and operating instruction panels were received regularly in quantity from Technical Intelligence teams in the field and from postal censors. Preliminary translations were rendered for the benefit of the analysis sections and the plates were then transmitted directly to the United States. In view of comments from consignees in the United States, packing and crating of equipment for shipment was conducted with greater care for durability. Additional precautions were taken to insure adequate labeling of crates and inclosing of sufficient copies of vouchers and packing lists to facilitate recognition of equipment and acknowledgement of receipt. With the opening of the Luzon operation, steps were taken to close down the Depot at Finschhafen and to prepare to move the entire shipping and receiving sections and six analysis laboratories (except for a rear-echelon force) to Manila, Luzon, Philipine Islands, when it should be taken. In the meantime, team personnel remaining at the Depot were trained under supervision of team commanders with the assistance of analysis section chiefs, while analysis section personnel were occupied principally with writing technical reports and disposing of captured equipment on hand in preparation for the contemplated move. They crated equipment that would be needed and as additional tools and instruments were acquired, chests were constructed, labeled and stored. Only the minimum requirements in tools were retained in the shops as operating equipment. Personnel from the various analysis sections made a trip to Sio, New Guinea, to obtain enemy material which had been left there by the Japanese approximately ten months before. British Civil Affairs units were of great assistance in this operation. Eighteen Eighth Army Technical Inteeligence officers and men moved forward by air during January to join units in the field. Vehicles and equipment of these teams were safehanded later when shipping space was available. The Assistant Coordinator of Technical Intelligence, USASOS, and the Ordnance Intelligence officer, same Headquarters, visited the Technical Intelligence Depot in January to expedite forward movement of Technical Intelligence teams. They brought with them a shipment of speed graphic cameras for use in the field and in the sections, to facilitate preparation of technical reports. Operations at the Technical Intelligence Depot, Finschhafen, ceased on 28 February 1945. All analysis and organizational equipment was readied for immediate shipment to the new depot area in Manila. Loading commenced 6 March and the detachment was scheduled to sail 12 March. The closing of the Technical Intelligence Depot necessitated turning over approximately thirty-five tons of captured equipment to the Ordnance Officer, Base "F". Complete arrangements were made for expediting the loading of this equipment by the first available water transportation. Captain Thomas, Office of the Assistant Executive S-2, Base "F", served as captured material officer at the Base had been shipped. It was anticipated that receipts of enemy equipment at Base "F" would continue for one or two months while the new Depot was getting established in Manila. A total of 68 officers and 139 enlisted men were on detached service, during February to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). Of these, nine Technical Intelligence units, composed of 36 officers and 60 enlisted men, were on temporary duty to the Sixth Army and three Technical Intelligence units, composed of 16 officers and 27 enlisted men, were on temporary duty to the Eighth Army. Additional Technical Intelligence teams which had been staging, sailed for forward areas from Base "F" before movement of the Depot. The Headquarters of the united States Army Technical Intelligence Depot, composed of 8 officers and 38 enlised men, departed from Finschhafen, New Guinea, for Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 12 March. With the movement of the Depot to Manila and the transfer there of Headquarters USASOS, that city became the hub of Technical Intelligence activities in the Pacific theator. Technical Intelligence in the Western Pacific area had come of age and was operating more efficiently than at any previous time. Technical Intelligence on Luzon after February 1945 began to slow down. All the previously discussed Field Units -- had been relieved from field duty by March and returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot for duty with analysis sections. Field Unit No. 5, however, remained on operations with XIV Corps. Three other units were also in the field after March: Field Unit No. 4, which had participated in the original Luzon Landings, assigned to I Corps; Field Unit No. 8, new in the field, also assigned to I Corps; and Field Unit No. 9, newly assigned to XI Corps. Headquarters Sixth Army, located at San Fernando, Pampanga Province, instituted an extensive training course on enemy equipment for its troops during the month of May. Altogether, nine Technical Intelligence teams, designated as "Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction Teams", participated in this program, conducted under the direction of the AC of S, G-3. In addition to Units that were in the field during April, and the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction teams, there were added two individual teams operating directly under Sixth Army G-2 on special assignments. Instead of being confined to certain sectors, these teams covered all areas occupied by Sixth Army combat units on Luzon. To assist the guerrilla forces in Northern Luzon in locating, collecting and repairing items of equipment, T/3 Lischalk and Pvt Thevenot, Ordnance technicians, functioned as an Enemy Weapons Team working directly under the Special Intelligence Section, Sixth Army Headquarters. Pvt Thevenot was hospialized some time later, but Sgt. Lischalk, aided by his team conducted training in the field, and continued to supply the troops with weapons and ammunition. Due to his work, considerably quantities of Japanese Ordnance material were utilized by the guerillas in the Northern Luzon area. The other special team was a JAPLAT Team consisting of T/Sgt Horton and Sgt Branigan which worked directly out of Sixth Army Headquarters and was assigned to the collection of JAPLAT, code name for nameplates and rubbings from captured equipment. Of the seven original Field Units that had launched the operations in Southern Luzon only Field Units 4 and 5 remained in the field during March and April. The rest were returned to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and were replaced by Field Units 8 and 9. Field Unit No. 8 left Finschhafen on 5 March 1945 just before the Depot closed in preparation for the transfer to Manila. As the Unit was new in the field, it operated in conjunction with Field Unit No. 4 until the end of March, and as in the case of new personnel, a good deal of its time was absorbed at first in becoming familiar with field operations in preparation for future assignments. Field Unit No. 8, acting upon instruction of G-2, I Corps operated with the 32d and 25th Divisions in the Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass areas of Northern Luzon from 24 March on through April. In addition to their regular duties, all sections of this Unit cooperated to collect numerous items of enemy equipment to be added to the I Corps Information and Education Center's display. CWS Team No. 13 of this Unit had spent considerable time contacting the Chemical Warfare Officers of I Corps, including division officers, in order to concur with the new procedure of operation for CWS Technical Intelligence teams as directed by the Chemical officers of Sixth Army and I Corps. Engineer Team No. 6 found a considerable quantity of mines and booby traps. They were called upon to familiarize the troops with the equipment and to submit reports which were published by G-2 for the interest of all concerned. Later in May they were called in to Sixth Army Headquarters to assist in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction Teams' training program. The medical officer, operated in conjunction with Field Units 4 and 5, in the I Corps sector. Samples of 195 Japanese medicinals and laboratory reagents were recovered, together with samples of Japanese medical, surgical, dental and X-Ray equipment recovered from around Baguio. The medical office also identified the enemy drugs stored at PCAU hospitals within the I Corps sector to permit their use by PCAU physicians. Ordnance Team No. 9 recovered a considerable amount of enemy ordnance, involving several aircraft machine guns which had been used in ground combat. Some of this equipment was turned into a collecting company. Many of these repaired Japanese machine guns were turned on the enemy by United States and Philippine Army units in later battles. The quartermaster section had little luck recovering equipment as no enemy dumps of quartermaster significance were captured along the Ville Verde Trail or in the Balete Pass areas, though miscellaneous items were recovered. Due to the limited activity concerning enemy quartermaster items, members of this team devoted much of their time to assisting the Ordnance Team. However, some research on United States Quatermaster items was completed. T.I. Field Unit No. 9 was attached to XI Corps operating in the central Luzon sector. All six services comprised the teams of the Unit. CWS Intelligence Team No. 14 covering the 28th and 43d Division areas found some new equipment. Good examples of Japanese heavy Engineer equipment were located by Engineer Team No. 6. The Medical officer recovered some Medical material from a large supply dump; a microscope, an anesthesia machine, alcohol, miscellaneous bandages and dressings, lysol, a dental kit, a water purifier, and assorted quantities of drugs and medicines. Non-expendable items were processed through the Technical Intelligence Depot. Several types of heavy equipment were recovered by Ordnance Team No. 8 and Ordnance Team No. 7. This included a 15 cm self-propelled mount, a 70 mm battalion howitzer, a 75 mm gun, a truck and all types of ammunition. Two type 97 Jap tanks mounting 47 mm guns were found. During March and April, several changes in personnel were made within this team and the two Ordnance teams were combined as Ordnance Team No. 7 with Lt. Abbott in charge. In May, Cpl. Smallwood returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot but Lt Abbott and One EM reported to Sixth Army Headquarters as one of the Ordnance teams participating in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction training program. Many types of Quartermaster equipment were recovered by Quartermaster Team No. 6. As most of these had no Intelligence value, they were turned over to local salvage units for disposition. Signal Team No. 1 found that areas recently evacuated by the enemy yielded only small amounts of Signal equipment. Therefore, in June, the 2 man team covered operations and one returned to the depot and the other was assigned to Sixth Army Headquarters as Signal Team No. 1 in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction program. Sixth Army operations in central and northern Luzon during May moved slowly but steadily forward. East of Manila, where the enemy was strongly entrenched, their resistance was stubborn. Ipo and Jawa Dams, which controlled the Manila water supply, were secured intact, however, and the Japanese forces here, as well as in Southern Luzon, were encircled and reduced to remnants by June. In the north, Baguio fell, and though the Japs staged strong counter-attacks against United States forces along the Villa Verde Trail, they were pushed back from their cave positions along Balete Ridge, and Balete Pass itself was taken. At the beginning of June, the Cagayan Valley was the only large area in Luzon remaining in enemy hands. A combined American and Philippine force closed in on Aparri, at the northern end of the Cagayan Valley and secured the town without opposition on 21 June. Meanwhile, Sixth Army forces had made pincer drives from Balete Pass at the southern end of the Valley northwest along Highway No. 4 and northeast along Highway No. 5. On 26 June, near Alcala, Sixth Army's 37th Division made contact with leading elements of the 511th Parachute Infantry which had advanced south along Highway No. 5 following an airborne invasion near Aparri. This junction effectively secured the entire length of the Cagayan Valley. From then to the close of the Luzon operations, which was terminated by the end of the war, fighting consisted mainly in liquidating pockets of enemy resistance which had been bypassed. Headquarters 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional) and the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot arrived at Manila, Philippine Islands, from Finschafen, New Guinea, on 26 March 1945. Major Manley, Commanding Officer of the Company, had preceded the organization forward, arriving in Manila 12 March to select a site for the Headquarters. Specifications for the locations were that it contain housing, messsing, and recreational facilities for approximately 90 officers and 185 enlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence teams), as well as shop space for analysis laboratories for each of the six services, room for the shipping and receiving department, and sufficient ground space for a motor. Specifications for the locations were that it contain housing, messsing, and recreational facilities for approximately 90 officers and 185 enlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence teams), as well as shop space for analysis laboratories for each of the six services, room for the shipping and receiving department, and sufficient ground space for a motor pool and an Ordnance area for heavy equipment. This is typical of the way in which organization locations were selected in the city of Manila after its capture. While driving about the city looking for a suitable location, Major Manley spotted two large warehouses on top of a hill, had to circle twenty-five miles around to find a bridge to cross to the area. The place he had found turned out to be ideal. It was a 500 by 1,000 foot area four and a half miles east of downtown Manila, sufficiently removed from the dust and traffic of the destroyed city to afford privacy. Situated in San Juan Heights, a quiet residential district, the grounds were on one of the highest elevations in Manila. The two three-story warehouses, owned by the Oriental Printing Company, were unoccupied, and adequately housed the analysis laboratories, the shipping and receiving section, the enlisted men's and certain of the officer's quarters. A private home nearby, which previously had been occupied by a Japanese general, looked like an excellent officers club and quarters, but had already been requisitioned for a general of the United States Army. Nevertheless, everything worked out smoothly. When the general found out there would be a traffic of captured guns, tanks, and other heavy equipment being shipped in and out of the Depot close by, he relinquished the house and took another he preferred in another part of town. The house was converted into an attractive officers club and quarters. An enlisted men's recreation club 26 x 72 feet had to be constructed, as well as showers and washing facilities for enlisted men, latrines, a garage 26 x 30 feet in the motor pool, and an outdoor theater. With approval of the War Department, a photographic laboratory was later constructed to handle the requirements of the analysis sections and field teams. The processing of photographs taken by the 72 Technical Intelligence teams at that time assigned to the 5250th, and the preparation of the required number of copies for forwarding to the War Department, were so large a burden on existing theater facilities that they were unable to carry the load. The Technical Intelligence Photographic Laboratory became one of the largest in the theater. Prior to completion of unloading the ship on which Depot Headquarters had arrived it was moved to another location and struck an enemy mine, damaging the hold containing much important shop equipment. This ship, carrying both records and personal gear, was not raised and some of the material was not salvaged until the following October. Upon arrival at Manila, the various sections were assigned space, and commenced construction of necessary facilities. Collection and analysis were continued concurrently with construction despite the loss of the equipment from the ship. Some personnel from the analysis sections of the Depot were pooled during the major portion of May under Capt Walter Schween, who was named assistant company commander under Major Manley pending the completion of all construction projects. Lt Van Slyck, meanwhile, continued as administrative officer. Receipts of enemy equipment at the Depot in Manila consisted of steady flow of captured material from Technical Intelligence Field Units, from the provisional Technical Intelligence Depots in Luzon, from Headquarters Eighth Army, from Philippine bases, and from censorship detachments. Then the laboratory work was again in full swing, arrangements were completed with Fort Command for the handling of shipments of captured material to the United States. Standing operating procedure for the shipping of Intelligence samples, as worked out by Major Manley in conjunction with Chiefs of Services, Headquarters, AFWESPAC, was put into effect at the Technical Intelligence Depot, and initial shipments from the Manila area to the United States were accomplished. Included in these shipments were many new types of equipment not previously analyzed as well as large shipments for training purposes. In accordance with War Department Circular No. 13, 11 January 1945, regarding the shipment of captured material to the United States for Intelligence purposes, reports were made to the theater commander immediately upon recovery of the first, second and third item of Japanese ground force equipment not previously captured, so that this information might be cabled to Washington. As set forth in the British-American Agreement of 15 November 1944 covering captured Japanese Ground Forces equipment and Technical Research, shipments were also made direct to British destinations upon notification by the Director of Military Intelligene, British War Office, through the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Throughout this period Technical Intelligence information was disseminated to subordinate commands through the media of the "G-2 Weekly Report,"edited and published by the AC of S, G-2, Sixth Army, and the "Technical Intelligence Bulletin," published by G-2, Eighth Army. Technical Intelligence units in the field had access to similar publications originating with and distributed by the various corps G-2 sections. Elaborate displays of representative articles of Japanese equipment with accompanying descriptive reading matter, were prepared by all analysis section chiefs and set up at the Technical Intelligence Depot. Later this complete display was moved down the AFWESPAC Headquarters. A permanent display of Japanese Ordnance was also placed at Ordnance Headquarters, AFWESPAC, as requested by General Holman, Chief Ordnance Officer AFPAC: another permanent exhibit of Japanese equipment, consisting of 33 pieces of Ordnance equipment and 17 pieces of Quartermaster equipment, was issued to the 14th AA Command for a prominent display requested by the Commanding General of the unit; and a third similar exhibit was assembled at GHQ. Also indicative of the training aid given to troops were the thirty special Ordnance kits used during a training program instituted by Replacement Command. These kits, which were of considerable help in familiarizing the troops with Japanese infantry weapons, contained samples of small arms and mortars. By the end of May 1945, Technical Intelligence had secured a comprehensive and fairly detailed knowledge of all technical developments used by the enemy in the Phillippine campaign. Whatever the Japanese had developed that was new in equipment and techniques had been secured, studied, analyzed -- and that information disseminated to United States troops. Quantities of enemy equipment had been captured and were being shipped to the United States for training purposes. Though the Battle of the Philippines continued and thousands of Japs still remained scattered throughout the Islands, to all intents and purposes the mission of Technical Intelligence -- that is, of the men operating directly in the field with the troops -- was drawing to a close. During the following two months, units were gradually withdrawn from the field, returned to headquarters, and staged for the Blacklist Operations. With the "official" conclusion of the Philippine campaign in July, a survey of the results of Technical Intelligence activities from 27 March 1945, when the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot was established in Manila, to July 1945, indicated that 952 new items of Intelligence significance had been recovered in the Philippine Islands campaign. During the same period, over 4,000 nameplates and reproductions were shipped to the Ground Industry Section, Military Intelligence Service, Washington. Also, 244 technical reports were submitted by the analysis sections of the Depot; these covered a wide variety of both new and previousy reported Japanese material of all branches of service and were published and approved by the chiefs of services, AFWESPAC. In June AFPAC forwarded to AFWESPAC the requirements of Sixth Army for Technical Intelligence units for the coming operation. Five type "A" Units, five type "B" Units, one Field Depot Unit -- a total of 52 officers and 107 enlisted men would be needed for coming Sixth Army operations. These requiremnts were incorporated in the logistical instructions issued by AFPAC. Anticipating the Olympic and Coronet Operations on the Japanese mainland, seventy additional officers and one hundred and twenty five enlisted men were requisitioned from the War Department for Technical Intelligence duty in this theater. These figures covered only preliminary Sixth Army requirements. The company was also augmented 1 July by the arrival from New Guinea of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 98th Quartermaster Battalion. The commanding oficer, Major James D. Collie, was made Deputy Commander of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company under Major Manley. The Quartermaster Battalion also furnished office personnel during this period, and was responsible for the company administration. With the return of Technical Intelligence personnel to the Depot in the ensuing months, an extensive training program as a refresher course for these personnel and as an orientation course for the new Technical Intelligence personnel arriving in the theater was established at the Depot under the direction of the senior field officer of each service. The course, based upon practical experience in the field, included lectures, charts, and a complete display of enemy equipment. The seven-day program, which prepared Technical Intelligence personnel for future operations, was opened 18 August with an introductory address by Major Manley and was received with enthusiam. Classes were attended by all personnel present at the depot except those needed for section work. The Medical, Ordnance, and Chemical Warfare analysis section held supplementary specialist training programs for their men and certain personnel also attended a week long ammunition course at MEIU No. 1. At the end of July a request was made to GHQ that authority be granted for a Technical Intelligence pass to be authorized for issue by AFPAC to all Technical Intelligence officers operating in the Pacific theater. Authority was granted, and officers of 5250th were issued Technical Intelligence passes which considerably expedited their work. For some months past, both Col Sauve, G-2 USASOS, and Major Manley, coordinator of Technical Intelligence, had urged the consolidation of all Technial Intelligence activities under the coordinating command at GHQ. Shortly after the activation of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, (AFPAC) they had drafted a complete plan for operation of Technical Intelligence under that headquarters and had submitted it, together with a proposed table of allotments to provide for all personnel at that time on detached service with the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. Assuming that a separate area command would in due course of time be formed for operations within the Philippines and southward, and pointing out that additional armies coming under AFPAC that would be totally unfamiliar with Technical Intelligence as established in SWPA, they recommended that to minimize confusion delay and duplication of effort, centralized control under AFPAC be established. Their recommendation was temporarily shelved but was later adopted on an even more comprehensive scale. When the atomic bomb suddenly emerged upon the scene, when the was was abruptly ended, and the entire industrial, scientific and technological resources of the Japanese Empire were opened for investigation, centralized control - not only for the United States Army but for all Allied Headquarters - was mandatory. Friday evening, 10 August 1945, around 2100 hours, the Manila radio station, WVTB, broadcast that it had been "unofficially" announced that the Japanese Imperial Government had indicated they would accept the Potsdam peace terms. After the long wait Saturday night, 11 August, the news of the Japanese surrender was officially confirmed in Manila Sunday morning, 12 August. Every plan that had been made for the impending Olympic Operation was suspended. The Armies made a rapid shift of weight from combat force to army of occupation. Technical Intelligence Units were alerted to move to Japan 23 August, necessitating an immediate and tremendous turnover of personnel. Practically all personnel in the field were ordered immediately into the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot. At the same time, arrangements were made to attach additional personnel to the 5250th so that more teams could be organized. Thirty-eight new officer and 58 enlisted men from all branches of service joined the organization during the course of the month. All Technical Intelligence units were equipped and trained and ready to move out on the dates set by General Headquarters. Major construction projects finished during August were new enlisted men and officer mess halls and two buildings originally intended for the Medical analysis section. Crowded conditions in the enlisted men's and officers' quarters caused by the additional personnel reporting in from the field were alleviated by moving approximately 50 enlisted men into the section which formerly served as a mess hall and by using the Medical analysis building as additional officers quarters. With the sudden move to Japan, the enlarged Medical Laboratory was not needed, and construction of a storage warehouse for the Signal analysis section was delayed pending decision on the future status of the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot in the Philippine sector. The movement of a majority of field units to line organizations eliminated quartering of personnel as a problem by the end of August. Preliminary plans for coordination of scientific investigations and Technical Intelligence in connection with ultimate operations were discussed at a conference held early in the month with the Special Scientific Consultant from the War Department, the Pacific Warfare Board, and the Office of the Counter-Intelligence, GHQ. The recommendation that had been made earlier in May by Col. Sauve and Lt. Col Manley (recently promoted) to G-2, General Headquarters that the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), at that time under the control of AFWESPAC should be attached to GHQ for operational control, again came to the fore. A recommendation from Chief Engineer, GHQ, to G-2, GHQ, advising the same set-up, kept the matter open, and at another conference, with G-2 and Chief Engineer, GHQ, in the latter part of August, it became increasingly evident that Technical Intelligence would be able to operate much more effectively out of higher headquarters. It was decided that no action could be taken immediately but that GHQ would arrive at a definite decision in the matter. Little was done about Japanese material in the Philippines at this time, as it was anticipated that all requirements could be met more satisfactorily in Japan and that the problem of Japanese material in the AFWESPAC area would be one of local disposition. Few bookings were placed with Port Command because of a tendency of services involved to stop all shipments until clarification from Washington of material required, due to the change caused by the surrender of Japan. Lt. Col Manley submitted to G-2, GHQ, a draft of recommended regulations to supercede USAFFE Circular 83, 1944, on the disposition of captured enemy material in the Pacific theater. The draft contained receommendation for retention of various items as souvenirs by individual soldiers since hostilities had been terminated. Personnel from ten Field Units and Field Depot Unit were assigned from 5250th to Sixth and Eighth Armies during August as part of the occupation forces for Japan (Blacklist operation). This split between both Armies the T.I. units originally intended for Sixth Army alone. Technical Intelligence target objective folders were published and distributed to the Units as they left the Depot as well as to all corps and divisions under Sixth Army. These folders outlined by areas various targets of interest to Technical and Technological Intelligence on the Islands of Japan. Forms for reporting on Japanese industrial installations were also distributed to the teams. With the war ended, the quantity of new captured enemy equipment received at the Depot during the month was negligible. Analysis of enemy equipment at the Manila depot had ceased by September, except for clearing up 58 reports already under way. All equipment on hand was disposed of as soon as possible. In the month of August 194,080 pounds of enemy material were shipped to the United States by water; 2,020 pounds by air; and 150 pounds by Army courier service. Water bookings during the same period amounted to 97,850 pounds. Air shipment of enemy Ordnance material to Military Intelligence Service, (MIS) United States Army Forces European Theater, Paris, France, left Manila 5 August. Two hundred twenty-eight photographs of captured enemy material were forwarded to Map and Photo Division, (MIS), Washington, D.C., and 283 nameplates and miscellaneous rubbings were sent to Ground Industry Section, MIS, during the same period. Twenty-one copies of compilation on Japanese economic data from the Signal Section were submitted to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFWESPAC, for further distribution to Sixth and Eighth Armies, and additions to the Japanese Chemical Warfare Notebook were sent to the printers. Ordnance material which had been captured aboard the Japanese hospital ship "Techibana Maru" was turned over to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot to be inventoried, photographed, reported, and retained in storage with its original packaging, pending receipt of instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces Pacific. It was held for use by the War Crimes Branch, AFPAC, for use in possible war crimes trials. Troops that had seized the hospital ship, however, had been allowed to souvenir much of the equipment before Technical Intelligence was notified. Lt. Col Manley had flown to Tokyo before the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company sailed from Manila, to make preliminary arrangements for the transfer of the unit to Japan, since G-2, GHQ, directed that a United States Army Technical Intelligence Center be established at Tokyo Arsenal No. 1, Shimojujo, OJi-ku, Tokyo. The Center was to be administered by the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company with Lt Col Manley as Commanding Officer. The Imperial Japanese Government was notified through the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo (memorandum AG 601 (19 Oct 45) GD, Subject: Acquisition of Certain Facilities of Tokyo Arsenal No. 1, dated 19 October 1945) that buildings 255, 263, 269, 276, 395, 475, 481 and the open areas adjacent to these buildings of the Arsenal would be "made available immedately for occupancy by an agency of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" (GH2, SCAP). The Imperial Japanese Government was directed that all items of supplies, equipment, furniture, furnishings and fixtures would remain in the buildings until a representative of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander to the Allied Powers designated the items required for use by the Allied Forces and those items which might be removed. It was further directed that the Imperial Japanese Government make necessary arrangements to have a representative of their office at building 395 at 1000, 20 October 1945, for a meeting with the representative of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The details pertaining to the work to be accomplished and the installation of the facilities referred to above would be "communicated to your representative at that time." Lt. Col Manley met with the Japanese representatives at the Arsenal 20 October and directed them as to the installation of bathing, sanitary, messing and other facilities which would be required and directed that buildings and grounds requisitioned would be thoroughly cleaned prior to occupancy by the 5250th Technical Intelligence company. The portion of Tokyo Arsenal No. 1 turned over for use as the United States Army Technical Intelligence Center, comprised eight buildings with a total of 157,949 square feet floor space, and a ground area 1000 by 1500 feet square. The main building, which had formerly been used as the administration center for the Tokyo Arsenal, was taken over for administration headquarters for the 5250th. One 3-story building was used for the shipping and receiving section, for company supply, and for the combined Army-Navy library of the Washington Document Center, Advance. One 2-story building was converted into laboratories and offices for the six analysis sections of the Company. One building, part of which was 5 stories high, was used for mess hall, quarters, and recreation center for officers, and a similar building was designated for similar use for enlisted men. A large warehouse was utilized as garage and motor pool, where all vehicles could be stored indoors. The seventh building was a theater for company personnel. Another building, which housed two scientific laboratories with testing equipment intact, was taken over in addition to the seven previously requisitioned and was available for use by technical personnel for analysis of Intelligence samples of Japanese material. Upon his return to Manila, Lt Col Manley appointed Lt Col Sullo, Majors Madigan and Hirst, and Capt Shaw as forward echelon to fly to Tokyo to complete arrangements for the arrival of the Company. They arrived 26 October and supervised the clearance of the buildings and had the premises set up so that when the ships with the balance of the Company aboard docked in Tokyo Bay the Arsenal was ready for occupancy. After the Company sailed from Manila, Lt Col Manley flew to Tokyo, leaving Capt Mary A. Chave, Assistant Coordinator of Technical Intelligence, and Lt Edwin A. Kurtz, Assistant Administrative Officer, as rear echelon for the organization. They followed 22 November. In a conference with G-1, G-2, and G-3, GHQ, in regard to the transfer of the Technical Intelligence Company from AFWESPAC to GHQ, it had been recommended that the personnel be assigned to GHQ, Special Troops, and it was suggested as desirable to preserve the entity of the organization in its name, "5250th", the number assigned it under the orders establishing the organization as a Separate, (Provisional) Company under USASOS. AFPAC assigned the company to Special Troops, General Headquarters Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, upon their departure from Manila. General Orders 337, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific, dated 20 November 1945, established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a theater overhead installation and stated that grades and ratings would be authorized by separate communication. General Order 369, same headquarters, dated 30 Nov 45, dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). By letter order AG 32003 (29 Nov 45) GA, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Subject; Allotment of Theater Overhead Grades and Strength, dated 29 November 1945, allotment of theater overhead grades and ratings was made to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company with a total strenght of 261 people. Occupation Instructions No. 2, Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 25 September 1945, outlined to the occupation forces for Japan the general instructions governing the collection and disposition of enemy equipment of the Japanese armed forces. This was the broad outline. The disposition of enemy equipment collected for Intelligence purposes was governed by later directives. General Orders No. 9, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Subject: Japanese Military Intelligence Targets, dated 2 October 1945 designated the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, to coordinate and supervise the exploitation of the military intelligence targets in Japan and Korea. Under this General Order, the exploitation of targets and objectives included coordination and utilization of certain general and technical Intelligence agencies: the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, including the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and field unit personnel; Translator Interpreter Service (TIS, a revised ATIS organization) Combined Document Center and field detachments; special staff sections responsible for the technical supervision of their respective Technical sections in the 5250th, including laboratory and field teams; Air Corps and Navy technical units analogous to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company; and special technical missions, national and foreign. Coordinating control and supervision over the various agencies interested in Technical Intelligence investigations were exercised through normal command and staff channels. These agencies included special staff sections of AFPAC Armies, separate Corps, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Far Eastern agencies, and special missions represented in Japan and Korea. Each of these agencies designated plenary representatives to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, who operated under his control and whose mission was to coordinate and supervise Technical Intelligence activities to prevent competitive duplication of effort. Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designed to accomplish the following objectives: First, the exploitation of material, including the examination and evaluation of available enemy material and deduction, from this evaluation, of the state of Japanese resources for war. Intelligence so obtained was exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United States and Allied Armed Forces. This included examination of Japanese facilities which might be involved in the production of material for war and the provision of trained personnel to assist the chiefs of services (Ground, Naval and Air) in the supervision of the collection, safeguarding the evacuation of captured enemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical and training purposes. Second objective of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific was the exploitation of documents. This involved providing trained personnel to screen and inventory enemy documents; circulating accession results, that is lists of documents received, to authorized agencies; extracting Intelligence needed for security and control by means of fragmentary translations or photostats; selecting military, technical, scientific and general documents for transmission to the United States pertaining the current target books published by the War and Navy Departments and the specific interests of specialist agencies; and, finally, focusing all field agencies of Ground, Naval and Air Forces through TIS for document activity. Third objective of Technical Intelligence was the exploitation of Order of Battle Intelligence and related subject: This involved lists of all regular units (Ground, Naval and Air) lists of code names and numbers, T/O's and T/E's of all types of units; lists of divisions, brigades and major units of Ground, Naval and Air Forces by components, strength, armanent, etc; lists of recruiting districts and units trained therein; lists of Army and Navy officers and their commands, including directories of transfers and promotions, biographies and service records; histories of major units; investigations of recruiting and training systems, of Home Guard and Volunteer Defense Units; investigations of military police, together with records of special and secret service organizations, (Tokumu Kikan); investigations of military intelligence agencies, including histories, operations, etc; and, finaly, reports on military societies. Fourth objective of Technical Intelligence was exploitation of historical records and official reports of the Japanes General Staff (Ground, Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan for war, the preparatins for the War of 1941, campaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area from 1942 to 1944, campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942, second campaign in the Philippines in 1945, campaigns in the Pacific islands from 1941 to 1945, and campaigns in other areas from 1941 to 1945. For effective coordination, the following policy provisions were enforced: To prevent competitive duplication, all foreign and national technical missions upon arrival were registered with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, who notified the occupation authorities concerned: G-2, GHQ, conducted all liaison with the Japanese Governmental authorities relative to the operation of technical missions, delegating such liaison as was required to occupation force commanders; since Intelligence targets were geographically distributed, the occupation force commanders were responsible for the coordination of exploitation of targets within their territorial jurisdiction, operating through subordinate commanders or staffs to prevent competitive duplications. To expedite the conduct of these investigations, G-2, GHQ, was authorized to correspond directly with the heads of the various interested agencies previously mentioned or their representatives on technical details, and direct correspondnece between plenary representatives and the heads of the agencies they represented was authorized. To protect Intelligence subordinate commanders or staffs to prevent competitive duplications. To expedite the conduct of these investigations, G-2, GHQ, was authorized to correspond directly with the heads of the various interested agencies previously mentioned or their representatives on technical details, and direct correspondnece between plenary representatives and the heads of the agencies they represented was authorized. To protect Intelligence material and records available in only limited numbers against exploitation by a single research agency and to make these items accessible to other Intelligence agencies, their removal had to be cleared through the occupation force commander. The principle of reciprocal exchange of reports applying to all field technical agencies, all reports of Technical Intelligence relating to investigations in Japan and Korea were cleared through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, prior to their being dispatched to locations outside the area. The War Department Intelligence Target Section (WDIT) was established under the provisions of General Orders No. 9, 2 October 1945 and General Orders No.15, 9 November 1945, to exercise coordinating control and supervision over the exploitation of military and civilian intelligence targets of interdepartmental and international concern in Japan and Korea. Col Walter S. Wood, appointed chief of WDIT, coordinated, supervised and established policy for the activities of the technical civilian and military subsections of WDIT and their relations with all other agencies. Operating under Col Wood, was the Technical Intelligence Section, headed by Lt Col David S. Tait, which was responsible for Technical Intelligence of all descriptions in the Pacific Theater. This section coordinated the activities of the Chiefs of Services of AFPAC, the U.S. Special Technical Missions, the Foreigh Technical Missions; made arrangements concerning the exploitation of targets of Technical Intelligence interest; and saw that proper technical personnel were assigned to complete the reports. Operating within the Technical Intelligence Section were: U.S. Army Technical Intelligence Center (5250th Technical Intelligence Co.); Collection and Reports Sub-Section, which coordinated the reports submitted with War and Navy Department Intelligence targets; Translator & Interpreter Service (2,000 personnel), charged with the translation and publication of all Japanese documents and with the furnishing of translator and interpreter personnel; Washington Document Center (ADVON) which selected and shipped all Japanese documents to the United States; and War Department Intelligence Collection Committee (ADVON), created by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, which advised the Theater concerning the transmittal to Washington of Intelligence information. Included in the U.S. and Foreign Technical Missions coordinated under the Technical intelligence Section were the following agencies: Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Economic and Scientific Section, British Staff Section, United States Strategic Bomb Survey, Japanese Antiaircraft and Seacoast Artillery Research Board, Air Technical Intelligence Group (Far Eastern Air Forces), British Amphibious Mission, U.S. Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine and Austrailian Scientific Mission. Temporary passes from the Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Military Intelligence Section, were issued to authorized personnel in accordance with provisions of General Order No. 9 to permit the bearer to enter any restricted area in Japan or Korea south of 38 degress north latitude for purposes of Technical Intelligence. Agencies furnished weekly a list of targets to be visited, notifying WDIT at least 48 hours in advance so that the local commander of the area and Translator and Interpreter Service could be notified. All requests on the Japanese Government were funneled through WDIT. Upon completion of target investigation, report was submitted to WDIT. Technical Intelligence Instruction No.1 Lt. Col. Tait, when he was assigned at GHQ, AFPAC, in Manila, had strongly favored coordination of Technical Intelligence when Col Sauve and Lt Col Manley had first proposed it in writing in May 1945. As Coordinator of Technical Intelligence under Col. Wood at Tokyo, Lt. Col. Tait drew up Technical Intelligence Instruction No. 1, General Headquarters. Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, dated 20 November 1945, that laid the foundation for the coordination of all Technical Intelligence activities relative to the occupation of Japan. Under this directive, the following prevailed: The United States Army Technical Intelligence center served as headquarters for the 5250th Technical Intelligence Compnay. As field units of the 5250th completed their work with armies, corps and divisions, they were recalled to the Center for re-assignment under G-2. Special investigators temporarily attached to chiefs of services and other agencies could also be assigned to the organization for administartion while in the theater. Chiefs of services and other intelligence agencies prepared plans for the exploitation of military intelligence targets in their designated fields and filed these plans with G-2 for coordination with other agencies at least 48 hours in advance of execution. The plans listed the names of personnel involved, stated the transportation and equipment required, and presented a brief outline of contemplated procedure. To assist in the investigations, additional qualified personnel, as well as transporation and equipment, could be requested from the 5250th through G-2 Operations on WDIT Form No.1. Photographers from the Photograph Laboratory that had been extablished at the Technical Intelligence Depot in Manila and re-established at the Technical Intelligence Center in Tokyo, could also be requested to accompany investigators on field trips. G-2 assumed responsibility for notifying other interested agencies; arranged with the occupation forces the details of billeting and transportation; notified, through its Japanese Liaison Section, the Japanese authorities involved; and, when desired, arranged for preliminary interviews with Japanese officials that often materially expedited the investigations. All interested agencies maintained a close liaison with G-2 and were held responsible for becoming familiar with the records and reports of Intelligence investigation maintained in the Technical Intelligence Subsection of WDIT so that unnecessary duplication of effort could be avoided. Documents necessary to complete investigations were evacuated through TIS to the Washington Document Center (Advance) Library at the Technical Intelligence Center. Samples of new or modified material or equipment which was to be evacuated were handled as follows. When practicable, the investigator personaly evacuated the item to the Technical Intelligence Center. If this were not adviseable, he made arrangements with Division G-2 for packing and shipping the equipment, and notified the Technical Intelligence Center that it had been sent. If shipment were delayed, he notified the Division G-2, who was responsible for safegaurding it until such time as the appropriate agency could arrange shipment to the Technical Intelligence Center, where further study of the material could be made at one of the analysis laboratories. If shipment were inadvisable, the investigator completed such study and photographs as were necessary and arranged with the Division G-2 for the security of the item. In all cases, final disposition was requested from the War Department and effected by Technical Intelligence Center personnel. Upon completion of the investigation, it was necessary that a report be submitted. To insure its adequacy, the Chief of Service specifically indicated in his orders to the investigating personnel the questions he desired answered. The report was mimeographed and distributed by the Technical Intelligence Center. These reports were eventually transmitted to research and development organizations in America as there was no longer any pressing intelligence need for them. For the most part, Japanese material, while well made at times, used obsolete technology and proved of little value to research and development organizations by comparison to German equipment. By 1946, the U.S. had begun a drawdown of the military and the technical intelligence personnel were also eliminated. The O.S.S. was disbanded and in-effect, the U.S. had no centralized intelligence gathering organization. A small technical intelligence element was retained at Aberdeen Proving Ground but their work was directed toward cataloguing captured material and preparing technical reports on Soviet weapons. They had no mission to train U.S. troops for future conflicts. The Korean War 1950-1954 In June 1950, North Korean troops corssed the border into South Korea. The immediate U.S. response was the dispatch of Task Force Smith. Equipped with the obsolete 2.36" rocket launcher, these troops found out it was no match for the Soviet supplied T34/85 tanks, a fact that technical intelligence had reported in the latter stages of WW II. In haste the new 3.5" rocket launcher, developed after U.S. technical intelligence had analyzed the captured German 8.8 cm rocket launcher, was deployed and began stopping the Soviet made tanks. A small Ordnance T.I. team was deployed to Korea and returned with a captured T34/85 tank. This was put on display in Washington, D.C. and then sent to Detroit for a more detailed analysis. Other Ordnance Technical Intelligence teams were deployed to Korea and were supervised by an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Control team, commanded by Captain Rudi Nottrodt. Captured material was sent to the technical intelligence center in Japan for further shipment back to the U.S. as required. These teams and other technical service teams remained in Korea until the mid 1950's when they were returned to the states and demobilized. Three detachments were kept operational, the 528th at Aberdeen, the 507th at the Detroit Tank Arsenal and the 283rd at the Missile Command in Alabama. Despite having access to large numbers of Soviet designed weapons, these teams did nothing in the way of training U.S. troops for future conflicts. The Vietnam Era 1965 - 1972 In the early stages of the Vietnam conflict, technical intelligence was neglected or handled as an extra duty by someone whose primary interest was elsewhere. Not until 1965, when Gen James McChristian became the MACV J2 did the intelligence organizations in Vietnam began to take shape. In 1962 the Defense Intelligence Agency ahd been established to provide intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services. In 1963 the Foreign Science and Technology center was established with the mission to monitor foreign scientific trends that related to weapons development and to analyze such fielded technology that came into their possession. With the establishment of these two organizations battlefield technical intellience had a receptive audience in Washington which aided greatly in getting Technical Intelligence established in Vietnam. Taking a page from the experience of WWII, a Combined Material Exploitation Center was established in Saigon and five field teams were established. Two teams were sent into the field and three operated from the CMEC in Saigon. D Co/519th M.I. Bn was the basic organization, supplemented by Technical Intelligence Detachments from each technical service. A contingent from the South Vietnamese Army complete the CMEC. The Vietnam era was the first time that large numbers of the new family of Soviet developed small arms fell into U.S. hands. Large quantities of SKS rifles, AK 47 assualt rifles, RPD light machine guns, RPG-2 and RPG-7 anti tank rockets, 106mm, 122mm and 160mm rockets, 82mm and 120mm mortars were but a few of the many new Soviet developed systems that came to the attention of the U.S. intelligence and R & D establishments. By 1972 all the technical intelligence assets had been withdrawn from Vietnam as the war was scaled down and the collection emphasis was shifting to heavier combat weapons captured in the mid east. The significant aspect of the Vietnam era was that it was the culmination of WWII Technical Intelligence. The U. S. M 60 light machine gun was based upon the MG 34, MG 42 and FG 42, the Soviet AK 47 was based upon the MP44, the RPG 2 and RPG 7 were based upon the WW II Panzerfaust anti tank grenades. Almost every item of U.S. and Soviet/Chinese equipment had its origins in WWII weapons and equipment recovered some twenty years earlier. In the post Vietnam era, despite an initial draw down of technical intelligence assets, the unit was reorganized and relocated to Aberdeen Proving Ground. In the wake of several mid-east wars, the National Training Center (NTC) was established at Fort Irwin, CA., complete with two battalions of opposing forces equipped with Soviet designed weapons. Technical intelligence classes were conducted both at Aberdeen Proving Ground and at the NTC. Mobile displays of Soviet developed weapons and equipment were placed on display at varius CONUS installations in the late 1970's and through the 1980's. In 1988 a large complex at Aberdeen Proving Ground was dedicated and now houses the Foreign Material Intelligence Battalion, a permanent part of the U.S. Army. It has recovered many items from places such as Grenada, Panama and most recently Desert Storm. Finally, the Army had learned from the lessons of WW II. THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM e-mail wlhoward@gte.net Telephone AC 813 585-7756 *********************************************** (The preceding was a product of the"Military Collector Group Post", an international email magazine dedicated to the preservation of history and the equipment that made it. Unlimited circulation of this material is authorized so long as the proper credits to the original authors, and publisher or this group are included. For more information conserning this group contact Dennis Starks at, military-radio-guy@juno.com) *